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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Guyana wants and needs development of its extensive natural renewable resources,
including its important water resources. It has been estimated that Guyana has
sufficient water resources to economically develop 7000 MW of hydroelectric power
generation over time.
With the growing global focus on sustainable energy
development and the realization of the importance of water to humanity, Guyana is
well positioned to begin the introduction of large-scale hydroelectric power
development. Utilization of Guyana’s hydrological resource to generate electricity also
directly displaces existing diesel based generation, resulting in a reduction in the use of
imported fossil fuel and consequent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Also,
reducing foreign currency payments and lowering exposure to fluctuating world oil
prices will stabilize electrical generation costs and consequently enhance both the
growth of electricity demand and the long-term economic development of the country.
It is inevitable that medium to large scale hydroelectric power generation will be
developed in Guyana. It is also inevitable that the population and industrialization of
Guyana will continue to increase, providing a growing demand for electricity and an
expanding energy market for projects like Amaila Falls.
Amaila Falls is being developed as a private sector initiative, with Government
providing cooperation and support by facilitating the development process.
Based on studies that were carried out in the 1970s, it has been determined that the
Amaila Falls project is the most desirable hydroelectric project of its size in the region
and should therefore be the first to be developed. Its location is sufficiently remote that
it does not pose any major social disruption and it relies on a watershed of 650 square
kilometres of relatively unspoilt and unused land. At 100 MW in the proposed first
stage, the project is large enough to handle the major portion of GPL’s Demerara and
Berbice area loads and the Linden area load for many years. While the length of
transmission line provides a challenge to the economics of the project, the establishment
of a 230 kV transmission link between Amaila and Georgetown will provide the first
part of a national 230kV interconnected grid (this is not necessarily related to or part of
any larger scheme to export power to neighbouring countries although inevitably
interconnections would be developed).
The project developers have submitted a Feasibility Study Report and a Final
Environmental Impact Assessment Report which are the subject of this review, and a
revised application for issue of an Interim Licence under the Hydro-Electric Power
Regulations.
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There are several areas where additional input and investigation are required to
properly define the project. They include:
1.

Hydrology. The developers have based the project viability mostly on data
collected in an adjacent water shed (Kaieteur) and the Amaila/Kuribrong River
basin hydrology has been inferred from this. At no stage have concurrent
hydrological data been collected to verify the relationship between the two water
basins. This review recommends that additional stream flow data be collected at
the base of the Amaila Falls for at least a sufficient period to confirm the
relationship to Kaieteur. Also, a detailed topographical survey of the reservoir
should be carried out to confirm its containment volume. This is a critical design
prerequisite to ensure that an acceptable flow of water is available during the dry
seasons when the amount of storage will determine the amount of “firm” power
which can be contracted to customers in the various Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs). It also verifies the height and size of the required dams and therefore the
cost.

2.

Cost. Capital costs must be reviewed further, particularly with respect to
infrastructure costs such as access to the site, clearing and preparation of the
flooded area, dam construction costs, civil costs generally including the water
conductor tunnel, surge shaft and penstock, unit concrete costs and transmission
line costs including route selection, surveying, clearing, land compensation and
acquisition costs. Also, operating costs must be reviewed to ensure that the
project has the necessary staff and equipment to deal with routine maintenance
as well as emergencies should they occur.

3.

Market. The energy market which the developers plan to capture appears to
have been overstated in the early years of the project.
The Omai Gold Mine, to which it was proposed to sell an initial 223 GWhrs of
“secondary” energy annually (decreasing to 63 GWhrs per year by 2011), will
have closed by the time the project is operating unless the results of ongoing
exploration are positive. This load has therefore been excluded from projected
markets in this review.
The Linden load is significantly smaller than the amount envisaged; currently
about 6 MW rather than the 15 MW assumed in the Feasibility Study Report.
This translates to an available annual energy market of about 50 GWhrs in 2007.
This compares with an estimated annual market of 114 GWhrs assumed in the
Feasibility Study Report.
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The Guyana Power & Light (GPL) load, which provides the cornerstone of the
project’s likely energy market, cannot be fully supplied by Amaila due to the
project’s distance from the GPL load. Synergy has indicated that GPL will have
to continue to operate end-of-line diesel generation for voltage and frequency
support and to provide back-up generating capacity in case of outages on the
Amaila supply system. In the absence of firm design calculations from either
Synergy/Harza or GPL, we have estimated that approximately 480 GWhrs will
be available to Amaila in 2007 (approximately 75% of GPL’s expected total gross
generation).
In summary, and according to the calculations included in Appendix E, it will be
2016 before Amaila Falls has an energy market of 775 GWhrs available to supply,
if it relies solely on the GPL and Linden loads. This means that the rate of 7 US
cents per kWhr proposed will not be sufficient to generate the returns envisaged,
especially in the early years of operation, without additional support from
government or third party funding agencies.
4.

Technical. There are several significant design issues which will need further
investigation as the project progresses but the most important matter is whether
Amaila will be able to deliver supply to GPL in a quantity, of a quality and
availability and at a price that will be attractive to GPL and which will be of
benefit to GPL’s customers who eventually will be the consumers of power
produced at Amaila. The definitive answer to this question remains outstanding
pending completion of technical evaluations between GPL and Synergy/Harza
engineers.

Amaila Falls (or a similar hydro project) will be built sooner or later. For the project to
succeed it must have a reliable and accurately defined water supply, an accurate
estimate of total development costs and operating costs, a proven design and a
sustainable energy market. Synergy should be actively encouraged to pursue the issues
which currently need attention and to produce a “bankable” feasibility study. Given
the present load scenario, it is unlikely that the project will be able to sell 100% of its
planned annual output until about 2016. It is possible that Government assistance will
be needed to make up this revenue shortfall.
This review recommends that the project be pursued with the ongoing collection of data
and supporting information. GPL has indicated a willingness to work with Synergy to
assess the effect of the project on the GPL system and to work towards developing a
PPA with Synergy. Linden Power Company (LPC) has indicated that it will be in a
position to discuss a PPA with Synergy after agreement with GPL has been reached. As
mentioned, the length and cost of transmission for the size of the generation and the
load makes the project a challenge. The project will come closer to financial
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sustainability with the passage of time and as loads grow to better support the project.
The length of transmission will remain a significant obstacle unless a substantial load
can be developed closer to the site.
Specifically, it is recommended that the following areas be pursued on an ongoing basis:
1.

Confirm that the site has the water flow profile to support the project and that
the reservoir has sufficient capacity to allow “firm” output throughout the dry
seasons.

2.

Confirm energy markets available to the project. This will be a dynamic
situation but will determine the net cost of supply from Amaila over time.

3.

Confirm capital and operating costs. In view of the plan to award one large EPC
contract, solicit expressions of interest from suitably qualified international
contractors and budget proposals from a “short list” of suitable bidders.

4.

Confirm the project’s ability to supply GPL by continuing the load flow
evaluations that GPL and Synergy/Harza have begun.

5.

Continue dialogue with the potential energy customers leading to expressions of
interest and signed Power Purchase Agreements.

6.

Continue to pursue access to possible financial support for the project from
international financial institutions (IFIs) via programs such as the Global
Environmental Facility, Clean Development Mechanism, the proposed
BioCarbon Fund and others.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
This review has been conducted by Kaehne Consulting Ltd. (KCL), of
Vancouver, BC, Canada at the request of the Government of Guyana, Office of
the Prime Minister. The review is based on the Amaila Falls Hydroelectric
Project Feasibility Study Report prepared for the project developers, Synergy
Holdings Inc. (Synergy) and Harza International Development Company LLC
(Harza) by Montgomery Watson Harza (MWH). The objective of the report as
defined in KCL’s Terms of Reference is “to provide the Government with an
assessment on whether the project is technically, economically, environmentally
and financially viable and to act as facilitator between Synergy, Guyana Power &
Light Inc. (GPL) and other prospective purchasers to develop principal terms for
Power Purchase Agreement(s), depending on the findings. The Consultant is
also required to make recommendations on how any shortfall in revenue could
be covered to assure the sustainability of the project”. The full Terms of
Reference are included in Appendix A.

2.

HISTORY
Amaila Falls was identified along with several other projects as a potential
hydroelectric development site during studies carried out around 1975. In the
intervening years various studies have been carried out to more accurately
define the project potential and over recent years, the Guyana Energy Agency
has confirmed the priority of the top six projects based on a combination of
factors including social, economic, environmental and technical. The Amaila
Falls project is favoured by the GEA as the first project to develop based on its
overall risk/benefit evaluation.
In 1998, Synergy/Harza was given the exclusive right to investigate the project
with a view to ultimate development, subject to meeting certain prior
requirements. As part of these requirements, Synergy has recently submitted a
Feasibility Report and a Final Environmental Impact Assessment which are
addressed by this review.
During 2001, field crews carried out drilling and related geotechnical
investigations on the site, environmental reviews and further hydrological data
collection. This included 8 months of measuring water levels at the base of the
Amaila Falls and 2 months of measuring water flows. This led to the submission
by Synergy in December 2001 of the Feasibility Study report and the Draft
Environmental Impact Assessment report. The draft EIA was replaced in April
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2002 by a Final Draft version, containing responses to comments received from
the EPA and others on the draft, and then by a Final issue dated May 2002.

3.

SCOPE OF PROJECT
The Amaila Falls project consists of a reservoir of approximately 180 million
cubic metres capacity, two dams of maximum height 30.5 metres, a water
conductor consisting of an underground tunnel, a vertical surge shaft and
surface penstock to a powerhouse containing four 25 MW Francis hydraulic
turbines and electric generators and a tail race for water discharge back to the
Kuribrong River. The power generated is fed to a nearby substation and
subsequently via a 296 km double circuit 230 kV overhead transmission line to
connect to the existing GPL system at Sophia Substation. Other proposed or
possible connections are to the future Tumatumari hydroelectric project (45
MW), the Omai gold mine and the Linden region including Linden Mining
Enterprise Limited (Linmine), the bauxite operation at Linden. The project
would be accessed by a new road from Pamela Landing, approximately 40.6 km
in length. An airstrip is also planned for the site. The project has an initial rated
output capacity of 100 MW and an estimated annual energy output, after
allowing for station and transmission losses, of 775 GWhrs (firm and non-firm).
Amaila Falls is to be developed as a private sector project. Government may
request that the project be structured as a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer project
with a degree of flexibility on the “transfer” aspect. Similarly, the project should
be identified and licenced in two parts; namely, the generation portion and the
transmission portion. The Amaila selling price of energy should also be stated in
two parts to allow separate accounting of generation and transmission
components. Government is also supporting the project by investigating
availability of carbon credits through initiatives such as the Global Environment
Facility and the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism.
The project includes delivery of power to its prospective customers at utilization
voltages, i.e. customer substations for Omai, Linden and GPL have been included
in the overall project costs (69 kV for GPL, 13.8 kV or 69 kV for Linden and 4.16
kV for Omai). Right-of way (ROW) costs including land compensation and
acquisition, clearing and substation costs are included.
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4.

TOTAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS –AMAILA VS. DIESEL
For purposes of understanding the difference in overall greenhouse gas
emissions from the Amaila project versus the option of continuing with diesel in
the long run, this section examines in a general way the long term effect that the
Amaila project would have on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
It has been assumed that the total life span of the Amaila project would be 100
years and that the average output would remain at 775 GWhrs per year
throughout its life. The diesel alternative assumes that an equivalent amount of
energy is generated using current diesel technology and efficiencies over the 100
year period. It could be argued that diesel combustion technology and therefore
efficiencies will improve over time and the ability to reduce emissions will also
improve. However, this comparison compares best available current technology
on the basis that this state exists and is proven.
It has further been assumed that the diesel alternative achieves operating
efficiencies considered acceptable in modern utilities and that these efficiencies
are maintained throughout the study period. Total GHG emissions from the
diesel alternative are given in Appendix I.
In the case of the Amaila project, allowance has been made for the net permanent
loss of carbon sink due to construction of 40 km of access road to the site,
flooding of 26.5 square kilometers of cleared land for the reservoir, clearing of
the water collection and generating site, construction and operation of the water
collection and generating facilities, clearing for, and construction and operation
of 296 km of transmission line. The loss of carbon sink based on the project’s
total cleared area and Guyana’s total forested area is approximately 0.2%. It has
been assumed that there will be no long term increase in methane or CO2
emissions from the reservoir due to the elimination of vegetation prior to
flooding.
Construction of the Amaila project is estimated to produce about 367,000 tonnes
of GHGs including burning off the reservoir area. Operation is estimated to
produce about 4900 tonnes per year or about 490,000 tonnes over the life of the
plant, resulting in an approximate total production of 857,000 tonnes of GHGs
over the life of the project. In addition, the loss of approximately 42 square
kilometers of forest results in a loss of carbon sink of approximately 1.78 million
tonnes GHG equivalent. The total net effect on GHGs of the Amaila project is
therefore about 2.6 million tonnes. This compares with approximately 13 million
tonnes total for the equivalent diesel generation.
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In summary, it can be seen that the net reduction of GHGs over the life of the
Amaila project is approximately 10.4 million tonnes or about 80% reduction over
the diesel option. It is anticipated that this element of the project will help
qualify for GEF and/or CDM credits.

5.

TOTAL PROJECT LIFE CYCLE COST – AMAILA VS. DIESEL
In order to properly evaluate the overall benefit of the Amaila project to Guyana,
a comparison of life cycle costs has been prepared. Life cycle costs include the
entire financial commitment to a project from its inception and planning, to its
construction and commissioning, through its operating life with repairs and
maintenance, finally to its decommissioning and rehabilitation. For the purposes
of this comparison, the life span of the Amaila Falls project is assumed to be 100
years at an average annual output of 775 GWhrs.
The equivalent diesel plant is assumed to be best available current technology in
2002 and also to be producing 775 GWhrs per year at optimal utilization factors
and operating efficiencies. Fuel is assumed to be No. 6 low sulphur low
vanadium and is assumed to cost a constant USD 20.50/barrel in 2002 dollars. A
discount rate of 5% has been assumed to determine the NPV of operating costs.
The full calculation appears in Appendix J, however in summary it can be seen
that the approximate comparable life cycle costs are USD 446 million for Amaila
and USD 625 million for the diesel equivalent.

6.

LICENCING OF THE AMAILA FALLS PROJECT
Amaila Falls is the first of several potential large scale hydroelectric
developments in Guyana which could materialize over the next few years.
Given the significant distance between Amaila and its intended primary market
(i.e. GPL) it is important to be able to separately evaluate the generation and
transmission components of the project. It is suggested that the project be
developed under separate licences for generation and transmission and that the
capital and operating cost of each component be kept separate for recording
purposes. Each portion of the project should be approached as a Build-OwnOperate-Transfer (BOOT) project, with the generating portion accessible for
purchase or transfer after say 20 years and the transmission portion available for
purchase or transfer at any time. This is to allow possible development of a
Transmission System Owner/Operator at any time in the future it becomes
appropriate. If other Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects develop
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quickly, this timing could even be before Amaila is complete. In any case, the
transfer cost would be at the depreciated or book value.
In the same vein, the Amaila selling price for energy should always be expressed
in two components, the generation and transmission components. This review
suggests that a ratio of 70/30 should be used for generation/transmission
respectively, based on the estimated net present value of the life cycle cost of
each of the components. This results in a split of Amaila’s 7 US cent/kWhr
selling price into 4.9 cents for generation and 2.1 cents for transmission.
Calculations are included in Appendix K.

7.

ENERGY MARKET
The Amaila Falls project anticipates supplying energy to three main customers,
namely Guyana Power & Light (GPL), Linden Power Company (LPC) and Omai
Gold Mines Limited (Omai). The Feasibility Study Report envisages initially
delivering approximately 438 GWhrs of “firm” energy annually to GPL, 114
GWhrs of “firm” energy to LPC and 223 GWhrs of “secondary” or “non-firm”
energy to Omai.
GPL currently generates all its energy from fossil fuel. The old steam plant at
Kingston which is scheduled to be retired soon operates on Bunker C heavy fuel;
the Wartsilas, which form the major part of the “priority dispatch” capacity,
operate on a No. 6 heavy fuel oil (low sulphur, low vanadium) and the smaller
units operate on No. 2 diesel fuel (or distillate). In all, GPL has an available
installed generating capacity of about 100 MW to supply a peak demand load of
approximately 90 MW. At present, GPL’s biggest diesel generating unit capacity
is 5.5 MW although plans are under way to add three new units of
approximately 10 MW rating each over the next three years.
In order for GPL to cope with the loss of one machine at Amaila Falls, it will need
to have approximately 25 MW of spare diesel capacity (minimum) operating and
on the system to avoid having to load shed or to take a partial outage. In reality,
if Amaila at the time does not have the ability to supply GPL’s entire load then
additional diesel will already be running to handle the load and the 25 MW of
support capacity would be required in addition to the loaded diesel capacity.
This could result in GPL having to run a considerable amount of diesel under
less than optimal operating conditions compared to a diesel only scenario. The
reason for this is GPL’s ability to control dispatch and spinning reserve capacity
with an all diesel scenario and its inability to control machine output
characteristics at Amaila. This places a higher level of burden on GPL’s

Review of Amaila Falls Hydroelectric Project
Feasibility Study Report

Page 9
June 2002

operations to ensure that its customers are not adversely affected by the
introduction of the Amaila project as a source of generation.
Similarly, when GPL is able to take all Amaila’s output in the future, an outage at
Amaila or on the transmission link to GPL will cause a major or total outage at
GPL. Unless 100% generation reserve is maintained, such an outage will
continue until the problem is solved.
Based on discussions with GPL and a review of its Development and Expansion
Programme 2002-2006, it was decided to model GPL’s future estimated gross
generation energy on a sustainable annual load growth of 4 % in each of the next
25 years. Due to the fact, however, that the Amaila project requires “end-of-line”
generation by GPL to provide voltage stability, some of GPL’s load will continue
to be served by diesel generation. In the absence of better data from system load
flow studies being carried out by GPL and Harza, it has been assumed that 25%
of GPL’s gross generation will continue to be provided by diesel. From the
operational point of view and due to the long distance over which power must
be sent from Amaila, GPL will also wish to continue to operate some diesel to
avoid total blackouts if the transmission line is damaged or if one or more 25
MW generators at Amaila suffer an unscheduled shutdown. Graphs of the
estimated energy available to GPL from the Amaila project over time are given
in Appendix E.
The Linden Power Company (LPC) owns and operates the power generating
plant at Linden which supplies both the Linden community and Linden Mining
Enterprise Limited (Linmine). The LPC plant consists of 12.5 MW of diesel
generation (five units of 2.5 MW capacity each) and one steam turbine with a
capacity of 7.5 MW. The combined peak load of Linden and Linmine is
approximately 12 MW although Linmine’s dragline which causes about a 4 MW
swing load is about to be retired.
LPC currently generates and sells about 4.4 GWhrs per month. It has been
assumed that long term growth will also be around 4%. Plans are underway to
encourage industrial and commercial growth in Linden as it becomes a hub for
transportation to the interior, a staging centre for timber traveling to the coast for
export and service industries related to these activities. The Linden regional load
has been plotted in Appendix E.
For the purposes of this review, the Omai load has been deleted. Omai’s
management has advised that, based on current gold prices and ore reserves, the
mine will close in 2005. The company is conducting ongoing exploration on an
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accelerated scale and is hopeful of discovering more ore to feed the existing mill.
To date, results have been negative.
In order to model the likely revenue stream to the Amaila project, it has been
assumed that the project can be commissioned by Jan 1, 2007 with 100 MW of
generating capacity available and sufficient stored water to permit normal
operation through the two dry periods in 2007 (February – April, September –
November). This date is taken from the Final draft EIA dated April 2002.
Mention is made in the Feasibility Study report of Amaila possibly supplying
power to towns and villages in the project vicinity. Given the small loads likely
from these communities, supply from the 230 kV transmission line is impractical.
If supply to these communities becomes an issue, consideration could be given to
extending a supply from the station service bus at Amaila, probably stepped up
from the generation voltage of 13.8 kV to 35 kV or so.

8.

SYSTEM LOAD FLOW
As an Independent Power Producer (IPP) with one major customer (GPL – the
Linden load accounts for only about 10% of the GPL load), Amaila will strive to
sell all its available output to that customer. The ability of the IPP to supply the
load will be constrained by the amount of water available either in the catchment
area or stored in the reservoir, the rating of the generating equipment and the
transmission system and finally by the size of the load itself. There will also be
secondary constraints such as scheduled and unscheduled outages. As long as
the flow of water into the reservoir is equal to or greater than the flow required
to produce enough electricity to handle the load, the plant operation at rated
output is assured. However, when the flow of water required to the generators
is greater than the amount of water flowing into the reservoir, the plant is then
exhibiting a dependency on stored water. This dependency reaches 100% when
there is no flow of water into the reservoir. In this situation, management of the
available water becomes critical to ensure that it can be used to maximum benefit
in the generators to suit the load. By matching water flow through the
generators (and therefore the power output) to the available load, plant
utilization can be kept as high as possible throughout the dry seasons.
There will, however, naturally be periods where GPL’s load is smaller than the
available water flow and Amaila will then be able to either store the water for
future use, or spill it (when the reservoir is full) and lose the future opportunity
to generate power and revenue from it. Conversely, there will be periods where
GPL’s load will be larger than Amaila’s output (for example, during dry seasons
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when water inflow to the reservoir will be less than the required flow to the
generators and the volume of water stored in the reservoir is insufficient to make
up the difference) and require that GPL therefore generate from other sources,
assumed to be its existing diesel generating capacity (or part thereof).
The long transmission distance from Amaila to GPL’s system at Sophia
introduces two concerns:
8.1

Losses which occur during the transportation of energy from place to
place, and

8.2

Voltage and frequency instability between no load and full load and
during transient conditions such as switching and block load addition or
rejection (such as when a fault occurs and when load is reapplied).
Synergy/Harza has indicated that Amaila will require “voltage support”
at Sophia in order to maintain acceptable voltage regulation to the GPL
system and customers. This could be in the form of a shunt reactor or
automatic voltage regulation via a regulator or on-load tap-changer on the
main power transformers at Sophia or a combination of these.

Losses have been addressed by Synergy in its proposal by specifying a double
circuit line with Drake conductor, which has a combined design capacity
approximately four times the initial intended load of 100 MW. Losses are
indicated in various references to be between 2 and 5%. This means that 2-5% of
the energy generated at Amaila never reaches the load at Sophia. This is normal
and reasonable for a line of this length.
The voltage and frequency instability concern is more significant and to date it
has not been possible to quantify this problem. Further discussion is required
with Harza and with GPL and its engineers at ESBI in Dublin, Ireland. The effect
of the voltage issue is that GPL will (may) have to continue to use its own diesel
generators to supply part of its load, therefore further limiting the ability of
Amaila to maximize its energy output. For the purposes of this review, it has
been assumed that Amaila is able to provide 75% of GPL’s annual gross
generation energy requirements and 90% of the Linden load. The assumptions
are based on the assumed levels of difficulty each customer would have
integrating the Amaila supply. As the GPL and Linden loads grow over time,
the combined energy requirements will exceed Amaila’s ability to supply. At
that stage, it can be determined whether to share available supply between the
customers or to provide more to one customer at the expense of the other. Based
on transmission distances and losses, it would probably make most sense to
supply as much of the Linden load as possible, cutting back accordingly on the
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GPL supply. This split will, however, be determined by the PPAs which are
agreed between Synergy and its customers.

9.

ACCESS
The project is currently accessed by water via the Kuribrong River (3 or 4
portages are required), an all terrain vehicle track from Pamela Landing, a trail
from Kaieteur Falls or helicopter from either Kaieteur Falls, Mahdia or an airstrip
at Maple Creek. Before construction can commence, a new road must be
constructed from Pamela Landing to the site, a distance of 41 kilometres. This
road must be of sufficient load capacity and width to allow the transportation of
the major earthmoving equipment required to develop the site and the installed
equipment, the heaviest item of which will be the transformers at approximately
100 tonnes each. Normal road weight limit is 18,000 lbs per axle and minimum
road width is 22 feet. One new bridge is required and several culverts will be
needed to ensure adequate drainage. The Ministry of Public Works will
determine road design and ensure adequate protection and drainage of water
courses, erosion control, camber, grades, bend radii and signage.
Road access to the site also involves ferry crossings at Mango Landing and
Pamela Landing, both on the Potaro River. Synergy has advised that the existing
pontoon (ferry) at Mango Landing is adequate to transport the loads required,
but that the pontoon at Pamela Landing is inadequate and will require
replacement with a bigger unit. The remainder of the road from Pamela Landing
to Georgetown is in good condition and will not require further upgrade.
In addition to the proposed access road which is to be located along the top of
the two dams, it is recommended that alternative road access to the powerhouse
be provided via a new road along the bottom of the escarpment and a bridge
across the Kuribrong River. This route would provide continued access to the
power house in the event that the dam were breached and access along the crest
of the dams were lost.
The developers have also advised that a permanent airstrip will be built at
Amaila. This will be essential once construction begins for ferrying the
supervisory and senior labour force to and from site and for carrying out medical
emergency evacuations should that be necessary. The airstrip must meet
statutory requirements and the developers must obtain all relevant permits and
approvals to construct and operate the facility.
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10.

HYDROLOGY
The project hydrology was first developed from data which was collected on the
Potaro River over a 40-year period from 1950 to 1991. This data was used to infer
the project water shed hydrology on the basis of an assumed flow ratio of
between 0.24 and 0.40, which has been averaged to 0.30. This method of data
transfer introduces potential inaccuracy into the project data, although
Hydromet supports this type of statistical analysis as reasonable. Further
sporadic stream flow analysis was carried out on the Potaro River downstream
of the project at Portage Falls between 1975 and 1980, however the applicability
of this data to the project may be limited as the water catchment area there is
three times the size of the project water catchment area. Given the severe
changes in global climatic cycles over the past decade, and the possible
significant errors in using inferred data, further hydrological studies should be
carried out.
The Government Chief Hydrometeorological Officer has advised that average
annual rainfall has not changed significantly over the past 10 years or so. The
most significant change is the rainfall pattern which tends to be more spread out
across the seasons and occurs in more severe specific rainfall events. The
spreading of rainfall through the seasons should be an advantage to Amaila in
that the effect of the dry season should be less. The severe rainfall events
however could lead to higher rates of silting and could require larger spill
capacity to prevent dam overtopping.
The position taken by the developers is that because inferred average flows at
Amaila Falls are 64 m3/sec and the project at 100 MW needs only an average of
33.5 m3/sec, there is sufficient safety tolerance in the figures to be reasonably
sure that a plant capacity of 100 MW can be supported. The planned expansion
(to 165 MW) would require a significantly larger reservoir to maintain plant
output during the dry seasons.

11.

RESERVOIR
The reservoir volume has been estimated to contain 180 million cubic metres
with the dams currently envisaged. The active (or recoverable) volume is 146
million cubic metres. The estimate is based on scaling from 1:50000 scale
topographical maps with 50 foot contours. The Final Environmental Impact
Assessment Report advises that the assumed area could be out by plus or minus
13%. If this tolerance is assumed to carry over to volume (i.e. assume no
difference in average water depth), then the contained volume could be between
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157 and 203 million cubic metres. This level of accuracy must be improved
before a construction decision is taken.
Clearing of the inundated area has been recommended in the environmental
report to eliminate or minimize the resulting formation of gases such as CO2 and
methane. It was thought by Synergy that this work could be carried out at no net
cost to the project as timber licences could be granted with the value of harvested
timber offsetting the cost of recovery. It is now believed that this is not the case
due to the long haulage distance and that there will be a net cost to the project of
some USD 3 to 5 million to achieve a properly cleared and burned reservoir area.
This cost has been included as an additional capital cost in this review.
In discussions with Forestry Commission personnel, we were advised that, while
the usual government cutting fees would be waived for timber cleared for the
overall project, the cut timber would be given to the local population.

12.

DAMS
Two dams are to be built, one across the Kuribrong River and one across the
Amaila River. The dams are to be built from local metamorphous rock and faced
on the reservoir side with concrete or asphalt. Although the Kuribrong dam is
located on top of a significant fault line, Synergy’s geologist has determined that
the fault can be grouted and sealed and that no unusual risk results.
A significant concern when building dams in areas of severe rainfall, is the
possibility of the dam being overtopped. Extreme rainfall events appear to be
increasing in frequency and magnitude and need to be addressed in designing
and sizing the dams. Although beyond the scope of this review, it will be
essential to carry out independent review of the dam and spill-gate design to
ensure that the statistical 1000 year rain event is considered in their design.
Similarly, the intake structure should be designed to permit easy access and
clearing during a flood event and to withstand damage from large floating
objects.

13.

TUNNEL
The proposed water conductor (the tunnel from the reservoir intake to the top of
the Falls) passes through an area thought to contain several geological fault lines.
Due to the stability of the subsurface structure in the area and the low incidence
of seismic activity, it is felt that these faults can be crossed without introducing
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major additional expense to construction or risk to the reliability of the project in
the long term. EPC bidders will note that geological drilling to date has
determined that the local rock is very hard and very abrasive. This will no doubt
impact on the cost of installing the tunnel and surge shaft.

14.

PENSTOCK
The penstock which carries water to the power house from the vicinity of the
Falls passes through an area of ‘house-size’ boulders which have been
acknowledged to present a significant construction challenge. (Refer to the MWH
Geology report page 31). This is an area for further research prior to making a
construction decision as the cost and risk could be sizeable.
As proposed the penstock is of sufficient size for the 100 MW plant rating.
Synergy proposes either to increase the size of the single penstock to
accommodate the future plant rating of 165 MW or to allow the future addition
of a second penstock if and when the plant is expanded. The intention is to
request alternate pricing from the EPC bidders.

15.

POWERHOUSE
The powerhouse is of a conventional design and will consist of four 25 MW
Francis turbines in a concrete and structural steel building with one end wall
removable for future expansion. The powerhouse is said to be located on solid
bed-rock and is far enough away from the Kuribrong River to avoid flooding in
the event that a 1000 year flood is experienced.
It is understood that Harza may be reviewing the optimal generator rating and
may be considering five units of 20 MW unit rating rather than four 25 MW
units. The smaller units may be more suitable to the intended market and may
not result in significant additional capital cost.
Alternative road access should be provided to the powerhouse area via a bridge
over the Kuribrong River and a road along the transmission line right of way,
meeting up with the main access road east of the project site.
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16.

AMAILA SUBSTATION
The Amaila Substation is an outdoor substation adjacent to the powerhouse. 13.8
kV three phase bus will connect each generator to two step-up transformers
which provide the transmission voltage of 230 kV. At present, drawings indicate
proposed 230 kV buried cable from transformers to substation. Synergy should
investigate the possibility of connecting overhead to reduce the cost and improve
reliability.
The two transformers are proposed to have a base rating of 37.5 MVA, or
33.75 MW at 0.9 power factor. Above this output (67.5 MW) the transformers
would need to rely on forced cooling from fans or pumped oil. This is
considered inadequate for the 100 MW rating which will be required more in the
future as the load grows and as the reservoir and dam are possibly increased to
provide better security of supply through the dry months.

17.

TRANSMISSION
The transmission line proposed is significantly over-built for the initial load.
Construction includes a double circuit which means that either circuit could
supply the load with the other out of service, providing 100% redundant backup. This is considered necessary due to the long transmission distance. The
conductor size has been selected to minimize losses and to provide the most
stable voltage supply possible. (Long transmission lines tend to exhibit large
voltage spikes when they are switched on and large voltage fluctuations between
light load and full load conditions).
Synergy’s proposed transmission design is considered most appropriate given
the plant capacity, load and length of line. It is, however, suggested that
consideration be given to revising the triangular configuration of the phase
conductors to provide an overall higher, narrower profile. This will minimize
the required width of the right of way (ROW) and thus minimize the amount of
clearing and upkeep that the ROW will require. The ROW width is proposed as
40 metres and this is considered acceptable providing that higher trees outside
this width are also topped or felled if they will pose a danger to the line.
Mention has been made by developers of using the existing 69 kV ROW between
Linden and Garden of Eden for the 230 kV, however this ROW should be
reserved for future secondary transmission, most likely at 69 kV. The 230 kV
ROW should probably be established further to the east on this section.
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18.

CUSTOMER SUBSTATIONS
As discussed elsewhere, this review assumes that commercial load exists only at
Linden and GPL in 2007 when this project comes on line. By that time Omai’s
ore reserves will be depleted and there will not be a load there worth connecting
(possibly 1-2 MW). It is therefore assumed that transmission from Amaila would
run direct to the Linden area where the first substation would be installed to
supply power into the Linden Power Company power plant. LPC would then
resell Amaila energy in place of the power currently being provided from LPC’s
aging steam and diesel power plants. The Linden substation would step down to
69 kV through two transformers (or alternatively a bank of single phase
transformers) and would be rated for a future load of about 15 MW (present load
averages about 6 MW without Linmine’s dragline and bucket wheel which are
scheduled to be retired by July 2002). The Linden substation would contain a
shunt reactor required to support voltage at Linden. Some additional form of
voltage regulation (on load transformer taps or a separate voltage regulator) may
also be required. It has been assumed that LPC would continue to generate
about 10% of its gross generation energy requirements in order to prevent total
outages if Amaila supply is lost and to provide additional voltage support.
The Amaila 230 kV double circuit transmission line would then continue on to
GPL’s Sophia substation where a new 230-69 kV substation would be built
adjacent to GPL’s existing substation. In recent meetings, Synergy and GPL
discussed an alternate delivery point at Garden of Eden, based on the system
support offered by the generating capacity installed there. This item is still
under review. If Amaila energy is delivered to Garden of Eden, GPL’s Effective
Marginal Cost of generation would increase, resulting in a further discount being
applied to the Amaila selling price.
The GPL substation would contain two 50 MVA step-down transformers and a
shunt reactor/voltage regulator for voltage control and stability. GPL is
required to maintain some diesel generating capacity also to support the Amaila
voltage supply and also for its own operating security reasons. (It should be
noted that GPL is committed to completing several 69 kV interties within its
present supply area prior to 2007. Included is the Demerara-Berbice intertie
which will ensure that Amaila supply can benefit both regions).
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19.

EPC CONTRACT
It has been assumed that construction of the entire Amaila Falls project would be
carried out by one EPC (engineer/procure/construct) contractor. This contractor
would be selected following a competitive bidding process and would then be
responsible for bringing the project from feasibility to operation.
Given the intention of project developers to award virtually the entire project
design, supply and construction under one super-contract, it is recommended
that the inquiry and tender process be commenced soon in order to confirm
project cost estimates.

20.

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
The Feasibility Study Report contains an annual operating budget of USD 4.3
million. Synergy’s financial model inflates this figure at 2% per year, however
because all other figures have been expressed in constant 2002 dollars, this
review removes that escalator. The O&M annual estimated cost should include
sufficient allowance to cover future planned major overhauls by accruing a cash
fund. The annual operating budget can then be levelized over time. Synergy
should confirm that sufficient allowance has been made for purchase of heavy
vehicles, availability of maintenance staff for trash removal from the spill gates
and the water intake, maintenance of the reservoir and the dam, patrolling the
watershed, clearing and patrolling the transmission line on surface and by air,
maintaining the substation equipment and maintaining access roads and the
airstrip. These requirements are in addition to the usual operating staff
requirements.
It should be noted that crews should be available along the transmission line
route to attend to faults with a minimum of delay. This will require crews and
equipment at Amaila, near Omai, at Linden and in Georgetown. Synergy have
not indicated whether they have allowed for live-line maintenance of the 230 kV
transmission system, the first of its class in Guyana.

21.

FINANCIAL MODEL
Synergy/Harza has produced a financial model for the project which has been
provided in confidence for the purposes of preparing this review. Two
schedules of costs were produced, Schedule A for a completion date of Jan 2006
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and Schedule B with a completion date of Jan 2007. Based on Synergy’s
preliminary project schedule included in Appendix D and the schedule given in
the final EIA, Schedule B has been used for this review. The total projected
capital cost of the project as outlined in the financial model is USD 315 million.
This amount includes a contingency of USD 13 million. It must be noted that the
financial model was not included in the Feasibility Study Report and is not
considered to be “bankable” i.e. of sufficient detail and accuracy to allow either
project financing or final statutory approval. It is likely that accurate project
capital costs will not be known until EPC contract bids are received. However, in
the meantime, the following areas are felt to require additional costing analysis:
21.1

Access road to the project. This road will require construction to high
standards and will require significant maintenance during construction, as
it will be the only access for all earthmoving and construction equipment,
some of which will be sizeable. Capital costs should include some
upgrade from Mahdia to Pamela Landing, a new pontoon at Pamela
Landing, 41 km of main road to the site, 15 km of secondary access to the
powerhouse and two bridges (one on the main road and one at the
powerhouse).

21.2

Clearing of flooded area. The project design includes the need to remove
all vegetation from the area to be inundated. This requires felling of all
trees, removal of all vegetation (except tree stumps) and burning off of the
area. Despite earlier belief that reservoir preparation would be costneutral based on the value of harvested timber, it now appears that due to
transportation distances, there could be a net cost to the project of USD 3-5
million.

21.3

EPC costs. The project has been structured to allow one EPC contract to
cover the entire project, including road, clearing and site preparation,
dam, water delivery system, power plant, substations and transmission
line. Thus the EPC contractor will be responsible for all the project
infrastructure costs including road access, air access, construction and
permanent camp, borrow pits for construction materials, crushing plant,
batch plant for concrete, workshops, warehousing, communications, water
supply, sewage and waste disposal, etc.

21.4

Substation and transmission costs. Synergy’s project costs do not allow
for ROW costs. However, project cost must include an Occupational
Survey by Lands and Surveys, Bartica office, detailed survey of the
transmission line route, ROW and substations; acquisition of land,
compensation to property owners, clearing and installation of an access

Review of Amaila Falls Hydroelectric Project
Feasibility Study Report

Page 20
June 2002

trail along the entire ROW. Substation costs should be increased to
include for shunt reactors, voltage regulators, on-load tap changers on
main transformers, spare main transformers and a powerline
carrier/SCADA system between Amaila, Linden and Sophia.
In summary, it is felt that the capital costs included in the financial model could
be low by about 10% which would result in a total project cost of about USD 350
million. The main items to be added are:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

22.

Access road, allow
Reservoir clearing, allow
Concrete costs
Transmission and substations
Omai interconnect, delete

USD 5 million
USD 5 million
USD 15 million
USD 20 million
(USD 10 million)

Original total project cost
New total project cost

USD 315 million
USD 350 million

AMAILA SELLING PRICE FOR ENERGY
Based on the Synergy/Harza Feasibility study, the project requires full capacity
sales from the first year of operation at USD 0.07/kWhr for firm power and USD
0.055/kWhr for non-firm power to provide the necessary revenue streams to
allow the project to proceed. It is suggested that this rate be maintained over the
long term as, following completion of the plant, Synergy will not be subject to
inflationary pressures or other cost variables other than water fees, corporate
taxation and payroll costs for operations personnel. Synergy had suggested an
annual escalation of 2% on selling price, however as this would have to be
approved by the PUC and passed on to GPL’s customers it is recommended to
not allow this escalator.
One other possibility is to allow Amaila’s selling price to contain a fuel
adjustment clause. This would follow GPL’s avoided cost based on the
alternative of fossil fuel based generation and could be applied on a percentage
basis, e.g. if GPL’s avoided cost were to increase by USD 0.01 due to increases in
the unit purchase price of fuel, then Amaila’s selling rate could be altered by say
half that amount or USD 0.005. Similarly, decreases in fuel prices would result in
a 50% reduction of the equivalent rate to Amaila’s selling price. At all times,
GPL’s customers would be protected from the full impact of equivalent fuel price
increases and would derive some benefit from fuel price decreases.
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Alternatively, the Amaila selling price could be fixed over long periods of time,
thus giving the customers of GPL full protection from fuel price changes, at least
for that portion of the GPL load which would be served by renewable sources.
The effect of fuel price changes to GPL’s cost is defined in Appendix L.
Because GPL currently purchases its fuel in US dollars (accounting for the major
portion of its operating costs), and because it is protected against significant
currency exchange fluctuation in its licence, it is considered reasonable to expect
GPL to purchase Amaila energy in US currency.
This review assumes that Amaila energy is sold at USD 0.07/kWhr for firm
power and USD 0.055/kWhr for non-firm power. In the early years when the
market is insufficient to cover Amaila’s output, it has been assumed that the
government will cover the revenue shortfall from a bond issue or other grant or
financial concession (or a combination).
Synergy will need to review its required selling price as its total project capital
and operating costs become more clearly defined.

23.

GPL AVOIDED COST
GPL’s current operating licence requires it to enter into a power purchase
agreement with the Amaila Falls developer providing that a licence to develop
and operate the Amaila Falls project is granted by the Government, and that
certain terms and conditions are met.
These terms and conditions include approval by the Public Utilities Commission
and “the principle that the purchase price paid by the Licencee (GPL) to the
independent power producer (Amaila) shall not be greater than the Licencee’s
marginal cost of electrical energy generation”. GPL is allowed to include
adjustments to reflect incremental losses and other capital and operating
expenses associated with the inclusion of the independent power producer in the
Licencee’s system, the term of the agreement and the expected reliability of the
supply from the independent power producer’s facility.
In the absence of published figures for the above, GPL avoided costs have been
estimated based on data contained in the 2000 Annual Report and presented in a
transparent manner to allow further discussion and agreement on the final
figures. As these values form the basis of the allowable maximum pricing
structure for Amaila supply and will need to pass scrutiny by the PUC, the
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approach taken in this review is outlined in detail. Refer to Appendix G for
calculations.
Three standard terms have been used to describe GPL’s avoided costs of
generation:
23.1

Marginal Cost. This is the incremental cost of adding new diesel
generation and is assumed to apply to plant and equipment similar to the
10 MW diesel units currently under consideration for purchase by GPL.
The marginal cost is short term and covers all capital costs including EPC
(engineering, procurement, construction), GPL’s internal project costs,
financing and insurance of new plant, fuel, parts and consumables. It
does not include corporate overheads, taxation, depreciation, indirects or
staffing costs as it is assumed that new plant would be operated by
existing staff. Marginal costs are presented in Appendix G as “without
Amaila” and “with Amaila” to identify the differing levels of operating
efficiency likely under both scenarios.

23.2

Effective Marginal cost. This cost is specific to the Amaila Falls project
and covers the allowances made in the GPL licence. This includes an
amortized allowance for GPL’s capital cost to accommodate the Amaila
interconnection (substation equipment, protection and control,
civil/structural works, communications systems and similar) and
operating costs which include hiring of new staff, development of new
operating and dispatch procedures, training and similar. Also included
here is an allowance for “incremental losses”. It should be noted that, if it
is decided to locate the Amaila delivery point at Sophia, there will be a net
decrease in GPL’s system losses as the Amaila power would displace
power currently generated at Garden of Eden and transmitted at 69 kV to
the Georgetown region. At this point, and until such time as the delivery
point is decided (Sophia or Garden of Eden), it is suggested that
incremental loss adjustment be considered to be zero.

23.3

Long Run Average Cost. This is the average life cycle cost of generation
brought back to a net present value and applied on a unit cost basis. This
cost includes all GPL’s operational costs associated with generation and
includes administration, management, taxation, insurance, labour,
overheads and indirects. It has been assumed that this cost will be
reached in year 11 of the Amaila supply and that the initial Effective
Marginal Cost will ramp up in a linear fashion to reach the Long Run
Average Cost.
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In estimating GPL’s avoided costs it has been assumed that the most expensive
and inefficient of GPL’s current plant would have been replaced before Amaila
supply could commence. This includes replacement of GPL’s high speed
Caterpillar 3500 series units and the steam units at Kingston. Further, it has been
assumed that the 50 to 60 Hz conversion will be complete before Amaila begins
supply and that the frequency converters at Sophia will have been retired.
However, countering this likely improvement in operating efficiency, we have
assumed that, with more capital investment, carrying charges and staffing costs
will be higher and will offset the effect of efficiency improvement on total annual
operating costs.
In assessing GPL’s avoided costs it could also be argued that, with an IPP of the
size of Amaila being connected there will be an aspect of temporarily stranded
costs due to underutilization of recently purchased generating capacity,
specifically the 30 MW of new diesel generation scheduled for installation at
Garden of Eden by 2006. This aspect has been considered but at a discounted
rate. Over time, near new diesel equipment will be required to operate on an
increasing schedule as the GPL system load continues to grow beyond the ability
of Amaila to supply it (after 2017 Amaila cannot meet 75% of GPL’s energy
requirements).
Based on the calculations included in Appendix G, GPL’s Marginal Cost of
generation in constant 2002 US dollars is USD 0.073/kWhr, its Effective Marginal
Cost is USD 0.072/kWhr and its Long Run Average Cost is USD 0.096/kWhr.
These figures are based on an average purchase price of fuel by GPL of USD
20.50/barrel for the No. 6 low sulphur, low vanadium fuel which is assumed to
account for all fuel used for generation by 2007. A sensitivity analysis of GPL’s
avoided cost vs. fuel is included in Appendix L.

24.

REQUIRED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR AMAILA
Based on GPL’s avoided costs and the likely revenue requirements of the Amaila
project, it is apparent that there will be a revenue short fall in the first several
years of operation. This short fall could be reduced by a larger than planned
increase in the electrical energy market or it could be exacerbated by slower than
forecast load growth. It is hoped to be able to mitigate the effects of this short
fall during the ongoing development period of the project by seeking and
obtaining assistance from existing and emerging support programs. These
include the Global Environmental facility, the Clean Development Mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol and the proposed BioCarbon Fund. Once these
sources of financial support have been applied (grants, concessionary financial,
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carbon credit trading, etc) it is likely that there will remain a residual revenue
short fall which the Government of Guyana may have to address. One possible
mechanism for government support would be via the issue of bonds. These
bonds would be issued in advance of the likely revenue shortfall (i.e. in years 1
to 10 of project operation) and would be redeemed through a surcharge on
Amaila’s selling price once that has been reduced following the project’s
repayment of debt and allowing a breathing period for equity partners to realize
their required returns. This is envisaged to occur after, say, year 20 or 25.
This review models the shortfall between Amaila’s rated average output of 775
GWhrs/year and the likely market during the first 10 years of operation. Based
on the predictions used, the accumulative revenue shortfall to Amaila will be
approximately USD 80 million starting with USD 15 million in the first year of
operation and decreasing to zero after 10 years. This revenue shortfall would be
paid to Amaila to top-up its required income stream and would be repaid to
bond investors after 25 years from a surcharge on Amaila’s energy selling price
(which by that time will have dropped to USD 0.035/kWhr or so).
Alternatively, the government could borrow the capital required to build the
transmission portion of the project (estimated to cost approximately USD 80
million), introduce a wheeling charge starting at zero and rising over 10 years as
Amaila’s revenue gap shrinks due to higher sales. The transmission loan would
be repaid from wheeling charges. After 10 years, Amaila’s energy selling price
would be approximately USD 0.05/kWhr in 2002 dollars and the Government’s
wheeling charge would be about USD 0.02/kWhr, both expressed in 2002
dollars.

25.

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RISK DUE TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
In the event that final financial evaluation confirms the need for government
support to meet a revenue shortfall, the government will need to inject
approximately USD 80 million over the first 10 years of operation. These funds
could be provided from government bonds which would be floated in Guyanese
currency and redeemed after year 25 in the same currency. These monies would
require conversion to USD to meet the projects revenue requirements. Based on
historical performance of the GUD compared to the USD, it is likely that the
amount of funds required in GUD at the time of redemption would be GUD
70,115 million or an increase of 200% over the funds originally floated. This is
based on an average annual devaluation of the Guyanese dollar compared to the
US dollar of 5.4% (historical average over the past 10 years) and a bond interest
rate of 8% p.a. Refer to Appendix M. The chart in Appendix N shows the
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accumulating bond debt. This starts to drop in year 25 as bond repayment starts.
The accumulating bond debt peaks at GUD 64,000 million.
Redemption of bonds would therefore require a surcharge on the selling price of
Amaila power of approximately USD 0.02/kWhr declining over 10 years. If
Amaila were to require a base selling price of USD 0.035/kWhr after year 25 in
constant 2002 dollars, this would result in a continuing total selling price of
approximately USD 0.07/kWhr out to year 2042. Beyond this period the net
selling price could return to USD 0.035/kWhr for the remainder of the project
life. This reduction could then be passed on to the retail customers of bulk
purchasers like GPL.

26.

STATUTORY APPROVALS
According to the final EIA, the following Government of Guyana ministries have
jurisdiction over environmental compliance issues:
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Agriculture (issues water lease)
Ministry of Public Works and Communications
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry
Lands & Surveys Commission
Forestry Commission
Ministry of Housing
Civil Aviation Department
The Ministry of Health has responsibility for environmental health and pollution
control. The Ministry of Agriculture exercises control over state lands and
surface water through the Hydrometeorological Department. The Ministry of
Housing exercises control over ground water through the Guyana Water
Authority. The Ministry of Public Works and Communications exercises control
over the access road and telecommunications.
The Amaila project will require compliance with the following:
Environmental Protection Act
Environmental Protection Water Quality Regulations 2000
Hydroelectric Power Act and Regulations
Town and Country Planning Act
Public Health Ordinance
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1997
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Forestry Act
Guyana Energy Agency Act 1997 (covers issuance of the Interim Licence)
Electricity Sector Reform Act 1999
Public Utilities Commission Act 1999
In addition to the above, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission has issued
mining concessions in the area of the project and its water shed which would be
terminated. As these small concessions are renewed annually, there is sufficient
time to terminate them by refusing renewal at the time of expiry. A
reconnaissance concession has been granted to Migrate Mining which covers the
entire project area and allows non-intrusive exploration over 4 million acres until
2004. Migrate will then be required to limit further exploration to specific sites of
interest and these will be covered by smaller concessions.
See also Appendix O – Draft PPA, Schedule 3.

27.

SCHEDULE
The Final Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) contains a Section 2.2 “Project
Development Process and Schedule” which is repeated below for reference:
“Because the project will likely be financed under a non-recourse project financing
arrangement, it will likely be required that engineering, construction, equipment
procurement, installation and testing be performed under a turnkey project delivery
system where a single supplier takes all schedule and performance risks for delivery of the
project and all of its components, including 296 km of 230-kV double-circuit,
transmission line and related facilities. The construction contractor/equipment supplier
would enter into a contract with the Developers for the project development. The terms
of the contract for the construction and equipment supply would need to be structured so
that most of the environmental compliance requirements during the construction phase
are implemented by the construction contractor. The Developer oversees the development
process, and is always the responsible party. Where necessary, the Developer brings in
individuals or resources necessary to execute the requirements to comply with the
environmental requirements that may result from this EIA.
Before any construction takes place, it will be necessary to secure debt financing
commitments for funds to construct all features required for the successful operation of
the project. Debt financing for a project like Amaila Falls would likely require
involvement of large multi-lateral financing institutions with strict environmental
compliance requirements. This document is intended to substantially meet the
requirements of such institutions, although supplemental work may be required as some
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Project elements are defined further in continuing development work (the transmission
line, for example).
To achieve “financial closure”, the Developers must work on a number of fronts to
advance and complete all of the elements required for a successful project development.
The Developers must negotiate financially and commercially viable energy supply
contracts with potential customers for delivering the estimated 100 MW and 775 GWh of
average annual energy that can be produced by the Project. The Developers must prepare
technical specifications for the design and construction of the Project, obtain bids from
qualified construction contractors, negotiate a financable project delivery (construction
and equipment supply) contract, negotiate agreements with the Government of Guyana
and its agencies with respect to: land acquisition and rights, water rights, rights to
deliver and supply energy; road building permits, forestry and timber cutting, mineral
rights, environmental clearances, and company formation and agreements to operate and
do business in Guyana. The Developers must also arrange for financing, a large part of
which is proving to the potential lenders that all other issues as mentioned above are
addressed. The time required to accomplish all activities required for financial closure is
estimated at 1 to 2 years. Planning and final clearances for construction of a road to the
project site will require about one year, and construction of the road itself will take
another year. Project construction will require a three-year period after the road is
finished. The overall development process involving preconstruction activities and
project construction is expected to require 4 to 5 years to complete, beginning January 1,
2002. The expected project completion date is December 31, 2006.”
In accordance with the above schedule, this review assumes that revenue income
from the project will commence on Jan 1, 2007 and that the major site
construction will occur in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. To date, Synergy has
not produced a detailed project development schedule.

28.

DEVELOPER PROFILE
The project is being promoted by the development team of Synergy Holdings
Inc. (Synergy) of Pompano Beach, Florida, USA and Harza International
Development Company LLC of Chicago, Illinois, USA (Harza) who presently
operate under a Joint Development Agreement. Synergy is represented by its
President and CEO, Mr. Makeshwar (Fip) Motilall and Harza by its Vice
President of International Development, Mr. Patrick Hartel.
Synergy is
represented in Guyana by General Manager Mr. Patrick Ketwaru. Corporate
Financial Statements for each company are included in Appendix B.
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It is the intention of the present partners to form a Guyanese based project
development and operating company to be known as Amaila Falls Hydroelectric
Power Company, or similar. However, until such time as the Guyanese project
and operating company is formed it is not known what structure this entity will
take or which companies or principals may be involved. This makes it difficult
for potential customers to assess the business risk of entering into legal
agreements at this time. With due respect to Synergy, it is obvious that this
corporate entity does not have the financial or technical capability or the project
development experience to develop the Amaila project alone and this is not its
intent. It is therefore important for Synergy to finalize the new corporate entity.
(Note: Synergy President, Mr. Motilall recently advised that possible development
partners include Leucadia National Corp, ABB and IFC. Harza would remain as
Owner’s engineers. It is not known what the prospective partners’ level of interest,
commitment or capability is at this time).

29.

POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
Project developers will require some commitment from prospective customers in
order to secure the necessary financing for the project. At the time of this review,
it appears that two potential customers exist. The main one obviously is GPL
and the second one is Linden. Omai has been dropped from the study until such
time as it becomes apparent that they will still be in operation when the project
comes on stream, with sufficient proven reserves to permit a commitment to a
PPA.
In principle, there will be little difference between the PPA required with GPL
and that required with Linden, although it is fair to say that GPL’s concerns will
be greater and it will be the larger and more important customer when it comes
to shedding priority. Also, Amaila will likely require more voltage support from
GPL, making that relationship more complex.
A draft PPA was presented by Synergy/Harza for consideration by GPL. At this
stage, GPL has indicated that it is not in a position to negotiate or sign a PPA
with Amaila, subject to further data being developed by the project proponents
and pending evaluation of the technical issues regarding supply from Amaila.
As far as it goes, the format of the draft PPA proposed by Synergy is acceptable,
however it lacks certain terms and conditions which would be usual in a “take-or
pay” PPA. Take or pay means just what it says – the customer agrees to take and
pay for a certain amount of energy over an agreed period of time for an agreed
price. What the draft lacks, however, is the offsetting requirement that the
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Customer needs, namely that the IPP must guarantee the quality of energy
available, the quantity (with conditions), and the availability. The last condition
(availability) refers to both the amount of hours in a year which the IPP
guarantees to have suitable energy available, and it also applies to the date on
which energy of agreed quality and quantity will be available. This is required
because as soon as the customer has agreed to take and pay for energy from the
IPP, his other development plans change and he begins an increasing
dependence on the IPP (along with his own customers) as he defers or cancels
other orders for diesel generation, for example. It is reasonable that, in the event
the IPP cannot deliver his intended energy on the agreed date, he provides
energy of acceptable quality, quantity and availability from an alternate source to
the customer. The IPP is responsible for this alternative source and arranges it at
his own responsibility and cost and he provides it to his customer under the
same technical and commercial terms as the Amaila supply.
The above suggestions have been incorporated into the draft PPA which is
included as Appendix O.

30.

SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS
The Synergy feasibility study report states in a conclusion: “The Project appears
to be an economically and technically viable project”. With further work, it is
hoped that all participants can endorse that opinion. Regarding Synergy’s
recommended course of action the following should be noted:
a)

Project infrastructure costs (access road, reservoir and transmission line
clearing, ROW development) must be borne by the project,

b)

Financing of the transmission line must be included in the project scope,

c)

The Government will not provide guarantees for project debt financing.

If the project were to proceed to completion by January 2007, it is unlikely that
there would be a market for its full output. Our load projections show that, in
fact, it could be 2016 before the energy market is sufficiently large to accept the
rated output of 775 GWhrs of energy per year.
We believe that it will be prudent (and indeed may be a requirement to securing
financing) to carry out additional hydrological data collection on the Amaila and
Kuribrong Rivers at the project site. Despite appearances that a sizeable safety
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margin exists, it is critical to establish minimum flows through the dry seasons to
be able to better define true firm power.
Project costs are likely to exceed the figures so far projected. The isolation of the
project will result in significant access and freight costs which appear to have
been underestimated. Concrete costs are likely to be approximately twice what
has been allowed, resulting in an additional USD 10 to 15 million in construction
costs. Transmission and substation costs will likely prove to be USD 10 to 20
million higher than those included in the financial model, once ROW
establishment costs and substation requirements are defined.
Due to the long distance between the project and the load (mostly GPL),
reliability and stability of power is of vital concern. Synergy has stated that the
project cannot supply the DBIS without diesel generation being maintained by
GPL to provide voltage stability and power factor (VAR) compensation. This
limits the project’s ability to sell its output. The same situation applies to the
Linden load. For the moment, it has been assumed that the project must proceed
without the Omai load as their ore expires in 2005 unless ongoing exploration is
successful.
Recommendations:
a)

Proceed to collect hydrological data. A permanent station should be set
up at the base of Amaila Falls and should record daily stream flow
volumes from now until such time as flow is curtailed as reservoir filling
occurs.

b)

Proceed with a definitive system load flow study in consultation and in
agreement with GPL and Linden. The object of this exercise is to
maximize the amount of energy Amaila could supply to GPL and
minimize the need for GPL to operate supporting diesel generating
capacity.

c)

Further investigate ways to “bridge the gap” between the cost of power
required to fund the project and the marginal cost of power that GPL and
Linden otherwise face. One suggestion has been to float government
bonds which would be used to bridge the gap in the first years of
operation and then could be redeemed from an energy surcharge payment
once project debt has been paid.

d)

Look for alternative/additional energy markets, either in the region of the
project or in neighbouring Venezuela or Brazil.
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e)

31.

Proceed to negotiate agreements in principle with likely major customers.
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